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Abstract 
In a stylised framework of fiscal policy determination that considers both structural 
targets and cyclical factors, we find significant cyclical asymmetry in the behaviour of fiscal 
variables in a sample of fourteen EU countries from 1970 to 2004, with budgetary balances 
(both overall and primary) deteriorating in contractions but not improving correspondingly in 
expansions. Analysis of budget components reveals that the asymmetry is due to expenditure, 
in particular transfers in cash. We find no evidence that the fiscal rules introduced in 1992 with the 
Treaty of Maastricht affected the cyclical behaviour of the variables examined. Numerical 
simulations show that cyclical asymmetry inflated average deficit levels, contributing 
significantly to the accumulation of debt. 
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1. Introduction 
Although there continues to be some debate on the feasibility and effectiveness of fiscal policy in 
stabilizing output fluctuations, there is little disagreement that – as a rule – policy should not be 
procyclical. Procyclical policies can sometimes be warranted by the need to preserve the 
sustainability of public finances, yet there is no room for complacency regarding chronic 
procyclicality. If stabilization policy is to be consistent with fiscal sustainability then cyclical 
behaviour of fiscal variables should be symmetric, so that the extra deficit accumulated in bad times 
is compensated for in good times.  
 
However, there is growing evidence that fiscal variables react asymmetrically to positive and 
negative cyclical conditions. It has often been remarked that during 1970-2000 in European Union 
(EU) countries, deficits increased in downturns, but did not fall in periods of high growth, with 
countries offsetting the effects of automatic stabilizers via tax cuts and/or expenditure increases. 
The procyclicality of fiscal policy in good times is also a stylized fact in emerging markets.  
 
Buti and Sapir (1998) note that for the average of EU countries, “when there is a moderately 
negative output gap […] the actual deficit gradually increases,” while “when there is a moderately 
positive output gap […] the actual deficit remains stable,” and it is only “when there is a strongly 
positive output gap [that] the actual deficit improves” (pp. 87-88). Some evidence of asymmetric 
behaviour is provided by Buti et al. (1998) for high-debt EU countries where, between 1970 and 
1990, deficit-to-GDP ratios are around 6 per cent of GDP when output is close to or above its trend 
value, while the imbalance increases up to 8 per cent when output falls below its trend level. A 
previous version of this paper (Balassone and Francese, 2004) found evidence of a significant 
difference in the elasticity of the overall balance to positive and negative output gaps in a sample of 
sixteen OECD countries over 1969-2002.
1  
 
Concerning developing countries, Gavin and Perotti (1997) provide evidence of fiscal expansions in 
good times and contractions in bad times in Latin America. Talvi and Végh (2000) point out that 
fiscal procyclicality seems to be the norm in the developing world, not just in Latin America. 
Kumar and Ter-Minassian (2007) extend the analysis in Balassone and Francese (2004) to 
developing countries and finds that the overall balance deteriorates in contractions without 
improving in expansions. 
                                                 
1  The estimated elasticity (strictly speaking, semi-elasticity) is 0.4 for negative output gaps and zero for positive 
ones.   4
 
Available evidence suggests that expenditure play a predominant role in determining the observed 
cyclical asymmetry of the overall fiscal balance. For instance, Kaminsky et al. (2004) show that in a 
sample of eighty-three developing countries real government spending tends to increase much more 
in good times than in bad times. Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004) use a panel of twenty-two 
OECD countries and find that “the prolonged rise in the spending/GDP ratio [over 1975-1998] is 
partially explained by cyclical upward ratcheting due to asymmetric fiscal behaviour: the ratio 
increases during recessions and is only partially reduced in expansions” (p. 353).  
 
While the cyclical behaviour of fiscal balances is usually analyzed with reference to positive and 
negative output gaps, the cyclicality of spending is generally measured with respect to GDP growth 
rates. For instance, both Kaminsky et al. (2004) and Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004) define 
good and bad times as periods in which real GDP growth is, respectively, higher and lower than 
“normal” (with the norm defined as the sample average or median). Since periods in which real 
output growth is above/below an “average” value do not always correspond to periods in which the 
output gap is positive or negative, the available evidence on the cyclicality of spending and fiscal 
balances is not necessarily fully consistent.
2 
 
In order to provide comparable evidence on the cyclical behaviour of fiscal balances and public 
expenditure, we expand the stylised framework used in Balassone and Francese (2004) – which 
uses the output gap to define cyclical conditions – to allow for the analysis of the primary balance 
and individual budget components. We use data from a sample of fourteen EU member states over 
the period 1970-2004.  
 
We find significant cyclical asymmetry in fiscal variables, with the primary (and overall) budget 
balance deteriorating in contractions without correspondingly improving in expansions. Analysis of 
budget components reveals that the asymmetry comes from expenditure, in particular from transfers 
in cash. We find no evidence that fiscal rules introduced in 1992 affected the cyclical behaviour of 
fiscal variables. Numerical simulations show that cyclical asymmetry inflated average deficit levels, 
contributing significantly to debt accumulation.  
 
                                                 
2  Kumar and Ter-Minassian (2007) report regression results indicating an asymmetric reaction of the expenditure-to-
GDP ratio to positive and negative output gaps.    5
The stylised framework underlying the analysis is described in Section 2. Section 3 reports 
regression results on cyclical asymmetry in fiscal variables. The extent to which cyclical asymmetry 
affects deficit and debt levels is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
 
2. The stylised framework 
The stylized description of the dynamics of the overall fiscal balance in this Section is based on 
Balassone and Francese (2004), which in turn owes significantly to Hercowitz and Strawczynski 
(2004).  
 
We split the ratio of the budget balance to GDP (bt, with bt>0 indicating a deficit in period t) into a 
long-run component (b
l
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We assume that the long-run component is determined by a linear adjustment process towards the 
government’s preferred balance and debt ratios to GDP, b* and d*,
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Note that in the long run d*=b*/g, where g is the long-run nominal GDP growth.  
 
The cyclical component, instead, is proportional to the difference between actual and trend GDP 
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3  These can be thought of as the result of the optimisation of an objective function linking electoral support – or 
consistency with one’s “ideology”, or both – to a number of macroeconomic variables, subject to constraints defined 
by one’s preferred model of the economy (along the lines of the literature on the political business cycle; see, e.g., 
Nordhaus, 1975; and Alesina, 1987). Alternatively, b* and d* may be seen as the government’s preferred solution to 
the present value budget constraint (Blanchard et al., 1990). Artis and Marcellino (1998) provide a review of studies 
testing the hypothesis that governments actually behave so as to satisfy the present value budget constraint. Finally, a 
debt stabilisation motive in modelling budgetary decisions has been adopted in empirical analyses by several authors 
defining “simple” fiscal rules in analogy to the Taylor rule for monetary policy (see, e.g., Bohn, 1998; Ballabriga and 
Martinez-Mongay, 2002; Galì and Perotti, 2003).   6
 
The η coefficients in (3) include both the automatic reaction of the budget to cyclical conditions 
(i.e. what is usually called the budget elasticity to the cycle) and the discretionary action undertaken 
by fiscal authorities in response to such conditions.  
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which provides the basis for our empirical analysis.
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Countercyclical movements of the overall balance would require η
P,
 η
N <0, i.e. a GDP below its 
potential level (ωt<0) determines a worsening of the budget while economic activity above trend 
(ωt>0) determines an improvement. From (4) we define an asymmetry index as follows: 
 
(5)  N P η η φ − =  
 
If  φ=0 (η
P=η
N), then fiscal policy is symmetric with respect to the cycle, while if φ>0 the 
worsening of the budget balance due to a negative output gap is higher than the improvement in the 
balance experienced when GDP is above potential.  
 
Since equation (4) can only be estimated using ex-post evaluations of the output gap (as opposed to 
expected values), in empirical applications it must be interpreted as an instrument for assessing 
                                                 
4 A  different specification is often used where the cyclically-adjusted balance is regressed against its lagged value, the 
lagged value of debt and the output gap (plus, possibly, other control variables; see, e.g., Golinelli and Momigliano, 
2007): 
(a)       3 1 2 1 1 0 t t t t d cab cab ω φ φ φ φ + + + = − −  
Neither (4) in the main text, nor (a) above have micro-foundations. Thus, when choosing between the two models one 
can only rely on how they fit the data. From (4), using the identity bt=cabt + γωt (where the budget balance is split 
into its cyclically-adjusted component – cabt – and the automatic reaction to the output gap – γωt ) and dropping the 
distinction between positive and negative output gaps to economize in notation, we get: 
(b)    ) ( 1 2 1
'
1 1 1 0 t t t t t d cab cab ω γ η α ω α α α − + + + + = − − −  
Whereα0=αb*+βd*;  α1=1-α,  and  α’1=α1γ . Comparison of (a) and (b) shows that the two specifications are 
equivalent if: (i) α’1 =0 (that is, if current policy, as measured by cabt, is not affected by past cyclical conditions); or 
(ii) if the output gap is so persistent that it can be safely assumed that ωt=ωt-1. With our sample, in regressions not 
reported here, we consistently find α’1≠0. Moreover, the correlation coefficient between ωt and ωt-1 is about 0.5. 
Hence we retain (4) as our preferred specification.   7
whether de facto budgetary movements have been pro/counter-cyclical and symmetric/asymmetric 
with respect to the cycle, regardless of the government’s intention in that respect. It cannot be used 
to infer the policy intentions of fiscal authorities.
5  
 
2.1 The primary balance 
While the framework described above focuses on the overall balance, the policy variable of fiscal 
authorities is the primary balance. From (2), by decomposing bt into its interest (it) and primary 




t+ it and bt=pt+it , we have: 
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Equation (6) shows that by ignoring the composition of the overall balance, equation (2) implicitly 
assumes that: (i) changes in interest expenditure (it-it-1) are compensated one-for-one by the primary 
balance; and (ii) differences between b* and bt-1 have the same impact on p
l
t (as measured by α) 
regardless of whether they originate from pt-1 or it-1. 
 
Since there is no reason to maintain a priori either assumption, we modify (6) to allow for partial 
compensation of changes in interest outlays by the primary balance and for a differential impact of 
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Note that once we allow coefficients ξ and θ to be different from 1 and move from equation (6) to 
equation (7), we cannot assume that the other coefficients in equation (7) are the same as those in 
equation (2), hence the dash sign on α and β.   
 
                                                 
5  Otherwise we would be assuming perfect forecast on the part of the government, which is clearly too restrictive an 
assumption. When the purpose of the analysis is the assessment of policy intentions, two options can be considered: 
(i) the use of published government forecasts; and (ii) the use of forecasts produced by international organisations. In 
both cases data availability is limited. Moreover, official government forecasts may suffer from systematic biases (see 
Larch and Salto, 2003, for evidence of a systematic tendency to overestimate growth, especially during slowdowns), 
while forecasts by international organizations do not necessarily reflect government’s expectations (even assuming 
that they share the same information set). The informational problems associated with the analysis of policy rules 
have been thoroughly analysed in the context of monetary policy (see, e.g., Orphanides, 2001), but have received 
much less attention with reference to fiscal policy. See Golinelli and Momigliano (2006) for an analysis of fiscal 
policy reaction functions using real-time indicators.   8
Concerning the cyclical component of the primary balance, we assume that it is determined in the 
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Note again the dash sign accompanying the η coefficients, marking that they are different from their 
counterparts in (3) since they do not pick up the cyclical behaviour of interest expenditure.
6   
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Resulting in the following estimating equation : 
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Comparison of (4) and (9) indicates that an estimating equation for the primary balance should not 
be obtained by simple analogy with the one used for the overall balance without checking whether 
interest spending is a significant explanatory variable. Moreover, the inclusion of interest spending 




From estimates of parameters in (9b) we can recover the underlying value of b*. In the long-run 
equilibrium  we  have  ω=0,  b=b*  and  d=d*=(b*/g). Therefore, it = ρ (b*/g),   Δit=0,  and  pt=b*- 
ρ(b*/g)  (where ρ is the long-run nominal interest rate). Substituting in (9b) it follows 
 
                                                 
6  Interest spending is not directly related to the output gap, but its ratio to GDP is affected by cyclical fluctuations in 
output. 
7  To this end Galì and Perotti (2003) use a different approach. In their estimating equation the dependent variable is the 
cyclically-adjusted primary balance, which is regressed against its lagged value, the lagged value of debt and a set of 
control variables, including the deviation of the interest rate from a predetermined Taylor rule. Specifically, they 
compute the average absolute deviation between each country’s short-term interest rate and the rate generated by the 
following Taylor rule: rt = 4.0 + 1.5 (π - 2.0) + 0.5 xt , where r is the short-term nominal interest rate and x is a 
vector of control variables. They argue that this rule is generally viewed as a good first approximation of the 
behaviour of central banks that have been successful in stabilising inflation and the output gap and such a rule has 
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2.2 Expenditure and revenue 
In order to analyze the cyclical behaviour of different budget components, we use the following 
definition of the primary balance: 
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t (s=1,…,n) are primary expenditure items and r
s
t (s=n+1,…,m) are revenue items. 
 
For each budget item we write an equation similar to (9b). We assume that each budget item xt
s 
depends on the lagged primary balance (thus allowing each budgetary item to be influenced by the 
level of all the other budget components), the change in interest spending and its lagged level, 
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The sum over s of the estimates of ηs
P and η
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s in the m equations defined in (12) is equal to the 
estimate of 
P ' η  and 
N ' η  in (9b). 
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and the index of asymmetry for the primary balance can also be written as: 
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3. The empirical analysis 
We apply the stylized framework described above to a sample of fourteen EU countries (those 
belonging to the EU before May 2004, excluding Luxembourg) over the period 1970-2004. The 
data source is the AMECO database published by the European Commission
8. Data are annual. 
Fiscal variables are expressed in percent of GDP and display significant variation both over time 
and across countries. Output gaps are computed using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
9 The sample is 
unbalanced. 
 
The average net borrowing of the sample countries was 0.9 per cent of GDP in the seventies, rising 
to 4.8 per cent in the eighties and then declining to 3.9 per cent in the nineties and to 0.9 per cent 
over 2000-04 (Table 1a). The average debt-to-GDP ratio rose from 32.5 per cent in the seventies to 
56.2 per cent in the eighties and 71.7 per cent in the nineties; as a result of the reduction in 
government deficits, it declined to 64.0 per cent over 2000-04.  
 
Revenue grew from an average of almost 42 percent of GDP in the seventies, to 45 per cent in the 
eighties and rose above 47 from the nineties. The primary expenditure-to-GDP ratio, averaging at 
41 per cent in the seventies, rose above 44 per cent form the eighties. The share of transfers in cash 
increased over most of the sample period while that of wages declined throughout and other 
expenditure followed a U-shaped pattern (Table 1b).  
 
                                                 
8  Specifically, the data used in this paper are those of the Spring 2005 release of the AMECO dataset. 
9  To avoid end-point bias the Hodrick-Prescott filter is applied to GDP series longer then the regression sample (1960-
2006 as opposed to 1970-2004; we used Commission forecasts for the last two years). By definition, there are about 
as many positive as negative gaps in the sample. We tried different values for the smoothing parameter λ and found 
that econometric results are robust to different choices. For regressions reported in the paper we used output gap 
estimates obtained by setting λ=30. See Bouthevillain et al. (2001) for a discussion of the issues involved in the use 
of the Hodrick-Prescott filter.   11
3.1 The overall balance 
We start off by estimating equation (4) including time dummies to check for breaks in fiscal policy. 
Each time dummy covers a decade in the sample (1980s, 1990s and 2000s). The equation is 
estimated both using fixed effects (FE) and – to take into account the dynamic structure of the 
estimating equation – Arellano-Bond (AB) techniques (Table 2, Columns A and B). 
 
The results indicate the presence of cyclical asymmetry. The coefficient for the negative output gap 
is relatively large (-0.46 using FE; -0.39 with AB) and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
confidence level. The coefficient for the positive output gap is much smaller (-0.03 with FE; -0.13 
with AB) and not significant at the 5 percent confidence level. The asymmetry index φ is 




The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is lower than one and the coefficient of lagged debt 
is negative, so that convergence of the equation is ensured. 
 
Importantly, the exclusion of time dummies does not affect the results concerning cyclical 
asymmetry (Table 2, Columns C and D).
11 
 
The coefficients of time dummies estimated using FE suggest that there might be a break at the 
beginning of the nineties. The coefficients are not jointly significant, but those for the 1990s and 
2000s dummies are individually significant and they are not statistically different.
12 Given that the 
Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992, introducing constraints on deficit and debt for EU countries, 
we choose to account for the early nineties break with a 1992 dummy.
13 We use a general-to-
specific estimation strategy. First we interact a dummy variable for 1992 with all covariates (Table 
2, Column E); then we drop terms with non-significant coefficients (Table 2, Columns F and G, for 
FE and AB estimates respectively).  
                                                 
10   We used different partitions of our data set to check that results do not depend on strong responses of a handful of 
countries. Results were robust across regressions run on subsamples selected according to the average size of 
countries’ deficit, debt and social security spending. 
11  The same result is obtained when using time dummies defined over five-years periods. Annual dummies 
unsurprisingly interfere with our cyclical variables.  
12   This pattern is supported also by estimation using time dummies covering five-years periods. 
13  In 1997 the Stability and Growth Pact supplemented the fiscal rules introduced by the 1992 Treaty establishing a 
medium-term objective of a budgetary position “close to balance or in surplus”. We cannot test for a structural 
break related to the Stability and Growth Pact given the smaller number of observations after 1997.   12
 
We find no evidence that the asymmetry index is different before 1992 and after 1992, but we do 
find a break in 1992 concerning the reaction of the balance to debt. The negative coefficient of 
lagged debt becomes much larger and statistically significant at the 1 percent level after 1992 (it 
goes from less than -0.01 to more than -0.034), consistent with the notion that Maastricht fiscal 
rules increased the relevance of the debt level in determining fiscal adjustment.
14 
 
Overall these results confirm those in Balassone and Francese (2004; Table 2, Column H). 
 
3.2 The primary balance 
The specification used for the primary balance equation is the one indicated in (9b). Therefore, 
lagged interest spending and the variation in interest expenditure are included among regressors. As 
with the overall balance, also with the primary balance we follow a general-to-specific approach 
when testing for the 1992 break. Similarly to the overall balance equation, the 1992 dummy turns 
out to be significant only when interacted with the debt and the intercept term (Table 3, Columns A 
and B).  
  
We find that interest spending is a significant explanatory variable in levels, though not in changes, 
regardless of the estimation method (Table 3). This confirms the discussion in Section 2.1 that an 
estimating equation for the primary balance should not be derived by simple analogy with the 
equation for the overall balance.  
 
We find evidence of cyclical asymmetry also for the primary balance. The elasticity to negative 
output gap is again large (about -0.41) and statistically different from zero at the 1 percent 
confidence level. The elasticity to positive gaps, instead, is smaller (less than -0.17) and statistically 
                                                 
14   Our results are in line with evidence suggesting that fiscal rules can be effective in promoting fiscal discipline (on 
this issue see Kopits and Symansky, 1998). Numerous empirical studies suggest that this is the case for the 
balanced-budget provisions in the USA (see the references in Balassone, Franco and Zotteri, 2007) and in Swiss 
cantons (Feld and Kirchgässner, 2005). Concerning specifically the Maastricht deficit and debt limits, evidence 
concerning their positive impact on fiscal performance is provided, for instance, by von Hagen, Hughes-Hallett, 
and Strauch (2000). Concerning the effect of fiscal rules on the cyclicality of fiscal policy, our results (in line with 
Galì and Perotti, 2003) do not support a popular view in the recent policy debate according to which EU fiscal rules 
have reduced the ability of governments to conduct stabilisation policy. The argument is that during economic 
expansions, thanks to buoyant revenue, it may be easy to comply with nominal deficit limits even while increasing 
outlays and this in turn may require the adoption of contractionary fiscal policy during downturns (see the 
references in Von Hagen, 2002, and Galì and Perotti, 2003). Similar concerns have also been voiced with reference 
to balanced-budget provisions in the USA, where there is evidence that the majority of States appears to fail 
accumulating sufficient reserves during good times, resulting in procyclical policy in downturns to comply with 
balanced-budget rules (Sobel and Randall, 1996; Levinson, 1998; and Lav and Berube, 1999).   13
significant only at lower confidence levels (5 and 10 percent for AB and FE, respectively). The 
asymmetry index is about 0.25, lower than the one for the overall balance, reflecting the non-zero 
estimate for the coefficient of positive output gaps. The asymmetry index is statistically different 
from zero at the 1 percent significance level when the equation is estimated using AB.  
 
Using equation (10) we compute the long-run levels of overall balance (b*) and debt (d*) consistent 
with estimates in Table 3 (Column B). Given the break in 1992, we compute two sets of long-run 
values: one based on the dynamics characterising the period before 1992 and the other for the 
period beginning in 1992. For the euro-area average, the long-run deficit and debt levels decrease 
from 2.8 and 56.8 percent of GDP to, respectively, 2.6 and 52.3 percent respectively (Table 4). This 
result reflects large reductions in long-run deficit and debt levels in countries that were 
characterised by long-run deficits and debts higher than, respectively, 3 and 60 per cent of GDP 
before 1992 (Belgium, Greece, Italy and Portugal).  
 
 
3.3 Expenditure and revenue 
As a first step to analyze the source of cyclical asymmetry “within the budget” based on (12), we 
estimate two equations separating the primary balance into its expenditure and revenue components.  
In order to preserve comparability of results with those obtained for the primary balance as a whole, 
the equations are specified in the same way as the primary balance equation in Table 3, Columns B 
and C.  
 
Results highlight that most of the cyclical asymmetry detected in the primary balance comes from 
the expenditure side of the budget (Table 5, columns A and B). The elasticity of revenue to both 
positive and negative output gaps is not significantly different from zero. On the contrary, primary 
expenditure have a cyclical behaviour similar to the primary balance (even though the asymmetry 
index is not statistically different from zero). In fact, the estimated coefficient for positive output 
gaps is not statistically different from zero (though the point estimate, -0.16, is not negligible), 
while we find a large (almost -0.6) elasticity to negative output gaps, which is also significantly 
different from zero at the 1 percent confidence level. Taking the difference of the two equations we 
get results very close to those obtained from direct estimation of the primary balance equation 
(Table 3, Columns C).  
   14
To further investigate the role played by expenditure in determining fiscal asymmetry over the 
cycle, we break primary expenditure into three components: transfers in cash, wages, and other 
primary expenditures. Results, reported in Table 6, suggest that most of the cyclical asymmetry 
comes from transfers in cash. Wages and other primary expenditure behave like revenues: they do 
not significantly react to either positive or negative gaps. On the contrary, the elasticity of transfers 
in cash to negative output gaps is large (-0.28) and different from zero at the 5 percent confidence 
level, while their elasticity to positive output gaps is small (-0.06) and not significantly different 
form zero (however, the asymmetry index is again not significant). Summing up the three 
expenditure equations and subtracting the revenue equation we once again get results close to those 
from direct estimation of the equation for the primary balance (Table 6, Column E).  
 
To check the robustness of these results, we also estimate our equations as a system, by the 
seemingly unrelated regression method. More specifically, we first estimate a system of two 
equations (one for revenue, the other for primary expenditure) and then a system of four equations 
(revenue, transfers in cash, wages and other primary expenditure). In both cases, results are in line 
with those presented above: asymmetry comes from the expenditure side of the budget and it 
mainly reflects the behaviour of transfers in cash (Tables 7 and 8). 
 
4. The effects of cyclical asymmetry 
To assess the magnitude of the impact of cyclical asymmetry on debt accumulation we compare two 
simulations of debt dynamics for each country: one based on the asymmetric values of the ηs 
estimated from the primary balance equation in Table 3 (Column B); the other assuming symmetry.  
 
Symmetric fiscal reactions over the cycle require  c
N P = =η η ,  with c a given constant. In our 
simulations we assume that  0 = =
N P η η , i.e. fiscal variables do not react to cyclical developments. 
Setting c=0 allows to shield the results from the influence of the particular cyclical position of each 
country in the final year considered in the simulation.
15 The simulation exercise also assumes that 
all other coefficients are invariant to the value of the ηs.  
Both simulations are computed recursively based on the following equation: 
(15)  t t t t t s p d d + + + = −1 ) 1 ( ρ  
                                                 
15    We run simulations assuming other plausible values for c  (ranging between -1 and +1): asymmetry always 
determines excess debt accumulation and is positively correlated with the size of the budget elasticity to the output 
gap.
   15
where pt is the primary balance simulated on the basis of coefficients in Table 3 (column B) and ρt 
and st are actual values of average debt cost and stock-flow adjustment recorded in each year.
16 In 
this way, for each of the two scenarios, we end up with a predicted value of debt in the final year 
(i.e. in 2004). 
 
Table 9 reports the debt variation actually observed in the sample (first column) and the 
accumulation due to cyclical asymmetry in fiscal variables (second column), measured as the 
difference between debt accumulation in the two simulations based on asymmetric and symmetric 
ηs as described above. For EU countries, on average, debt accumulation due to asymmetric fiscal 
policy amounts to about one third of debt variation observed over the simulation period (one fourth 
for the euro area). The impact is relevant in all countries. 
 
The impact of cyclical asymmetry in fiscal variables can also be gauged by estimating by how much 
the average deficit is inflated by asymmetry compared to a baseline where the cyclicality of fiscal 
variables is symmetric. The third column in Table 9 summarizes the results of such an exercise: 
over the period considered the average balance, both in the euro area and in the EU, is estimated to 




This paper set out to verify the presence of asymmetry in the reaction of fiscal balances to positive 
and negative cyclical conditions and identify which budgetary items account for it. To this end, we 
derived estimating equations for the primary balance and for selected budget components from a 
modified version of the stylised framework developed in Balassone and Francese (2004). The 
framework was put to test on a sample of fourteen EU member states over 1970-2004. 
 
We found significant cyclical asymmetry in fiscal variables. The primary balance deteriorates in 
bad times without a corresponding offsetting improvement in good times: the elasticity to negative 
and positive output gaps is estimated at -0.41 and -0.17, respectively. Unless – contrary to what is 
usually assumed – automatic stabilizers are not symmetric, this asymmetry must come from 
discretionary policy. In this case, and provided our regressions control satisfactorily for other 
                                                 
16   The stock-flow adjustment includes the impact of nominal GDP growth on the debt-to-GDP ratio, as well as 
differences between the change in debt and the deficit arising within the Maastricht statistical framework (these are 
due to different accounting criteria, valuation effects and transactions coverage).   16
factors affecting fiscal balances, discretionary policy would appear to be offsetting a significant 
share of the working of automatic stabilizers.
17 
 
Numerical simulations show that, over the period considered, cyclical asymmetry inflated average 
deficit levels and contributed significantly to debt accumulation. The average primary balance of 
EU countries over 1970-2004 is estimated to have been 0.3 percent of GDP worse in each year than 
it would have been under symmetry. This accounts for about one third of debt accumulation 
observed over the same period. 
We find no evidence that European deficit and debt rules affected the cyclical behaviour of fiscal 
variables. However, the introduction of such rules is found to be correlated with a sizeable 
reduction in long-term deficit and debt levels for countries with significant imbalances before 1992.  
Our estimates suggest that cyclical asymmetry comes from the expenditure side of the budget, 
mostly reflecting the behaviour of transfers in cash. This is a composite spending category. It 
includes rigid components, not expected to react to cyclical conditions, such as pensions. But it also 
includes spending programs specifically designed to react to the economic cycle, such as 
unemployment benefits. Finally, it includes items which can be manoeuvred discretionally, though 
to different extents. It may be the case that this discretionary spending increases in bad times to 
provide shelter against recessions, but the new outlays become entrenched thereafter and therefore 
are not reduced with the following expansion. Alternatively, it may be the case that discretionary 
spending substitutes for automatic stabilizers as cyclical conditions switch from negative to 
positive. Finally, the possibility that automatic stabilizers themselves are not symmetric could be 
explored. Whether asymmetry arises out of political economy reasons, genuine mistakes in 
assessing cyclical conditions or because of, say, unemployment persistence is open to debate.
18 
 
                                                 
17  Estimates by international organisations of automatic budgetary elasticity to the cycle average about 0.5 for EU 
countries. See Bouthevillain et al. (2001). 
18  A variety of economic, financial and political economy factors can lead to fiscal policy being procyclical and 
asymmetric. According to one view, the roots of procyclicality lie in policy discretion and in the importance of 
competing electoral constituencies. A key argument is that constituencies and lobbies compete for their share of 
public resources, and a “common pool” problem arises. Since budgetary competition increases in good times, 
spending grows more than proportionally relative to the increase in revenue (Lane and Tornell, 1999). Another 
explanation of procyclicality stems from the premise that, while the government has the means to engage in 
countercyclical policy, it ends up not doing so due to an inaccurate assessment of the economic cycle. Indeed, 
analyses of the cyclicality of fiscal policy based on real-time macroeconomic data usually do not find strong 
evidence of cyclical asymmetry (see, e.g., Golinelli and Momigliano, 2006). However, difficulties in assessing 
macroeconomic conditions cannot explain why procyclicality tends to be asymmetric. Moreover, the evidence of 
systematic bias towards optimism in official forecasts of output growth is at odds with the notion that overspending 
in good times arises from inadequate information about the state of the cycle (Danninger et al., 2004).
   17
Whatever the sources of cyclical asymmetry, our results lend some support to the introduction of 
expenditure rules. Committing to a predetermined rate of growth of expenditure can reduce the risk 
of procyclical spending in good times while leaving the automatic stabilizers on the revenue side 
free to operate. An expenditure rule of this type can be relatively easily disseminated to the public 
and monitored, provided that the control aggregates are clearly specified.
19 Expenditure targeting – 
whether formally incorporated in a rule or not – has been playing a role in the fiscal framework of 
an increasing number of countries.
20 
 
It is important to ensure that the procyclical bias is not transferred to the revenue side of the budget 
and that there is a long-term anchor to fiscal policy. During boom periods for instance, governments 
might be tempted to cut taxes or increase tax expenditures, even while sticking to expenditure rules 
(this occurred for instance in a number of EU countries over 1999-2001). This suggests that 
expenditure ceilings cannot be set in isolation from provisions regarding revenue policy. More 
generally, expenditure targeting per se does not correct a structural tendency towards excessive 
deficits. A constant rate of growth of expenditure can be consistent with a gradual deterioration of 
the fiscal balance if revenues do not keep the same pace as expenditure. An anchor in terms of 
budget balance is therefore essential.  
                                                 
19   A variety of issues arise in the implementation of expenditure rules. These include the choice of the expenditure 
aggregate to be targeted (items included, institutional coverage, level of disaggregation), the time horizon, the 
underlying macroeconomic assumptions and the valuation criteria. See, for instance, the discussion in Kumar and 
Ter-Minassian (2007) and the references therein.
 
20  Expenditure rules are used, among others, in Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. 
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   Tables and figures 
Table 1a - Descriptive Statistics: main fiscal variables
(as a percentage of GDP; average values over the indicated period)
1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000
1979 1989 1999 2004 1979 1989 1999 2004 1979 1989 1999 2004 1979 1989 1999 2004 1979 1989 1999 2004
Belgium 1970-2004 63.0 114.7 128.9 103.6 4.8 10.7 4.6 -0.3 0.6 0.8 -5.0  -6.1  43.9 49.0 43.4 44.0 43.2 48.2 48.4 50.1
Germany 1970-2004 22.6 38.9 52.2 63.9 1.7 2.0 2.6 2.7 0.4 -0.7 -0.7 -0.5 42.2 43.6 45.1 44.3 41.8 44.2 45.8 44.8
Greece 1988-2004 21.3 48.5 102.6 111.4 12.6 9.4 4.6 5.2 -1.7 -1.7  37.3 38.1 43.2 32.1 40.4 45.1
Spain 1970-2004 13.5 34.3 58.1 52.1 0.2 4.4 4.4 0.2 -0.1 2.3 -0.0  -2.4  23.9 35.9 39.2 37.5 24.0 33.8 39.2 39.9
France 1979-2004 20.8 28.6 49.3 62.2 0.1 2.3 3.7 2.9 -1.2 -0.1 0.3 -0.1  44.0 48.7 50.4 50.8 44.3 48.8 50.1 50.9
Ireland 1985-2004 55.1 96.2 79.0 32.6 7.5 0.9 -0.8  -1.5 -4.6 -2.1  41.2 35.6 32.6 42.7 40.1 34.7
Italy 1980-2004 52.5 77.7 115.0 107.7 11.0 7.6 2.9 3.2 -3.1 -2.7  41.5 42.8 42.8 38.2 45.9 45.4
Netherlands 1975-2004 41.2 64.9 73.9 55.3 1.4 4.8 2.6 1.3 -1.6 -0.8 -3.1 -1.8 45.6 52.1 46.2 44.6 47.2 52.8 49.3 46.4
Austria 1976-2004 23.5 48.1 62.2 64.8 2.7 3.2 3.2 1.1 0.8 -0.2 -0.6 -2.1 48.2 50.5 50.3 47.0 47.4 50.6 51.0 49.0
Portugal 1977-2004 25.1 51.5 59.0 60.6 5.7 6.6 5.5 3.6 3.6 0.8 -0.8 0.6 30.3 33.0 38.9 43.7 26.7 32.2 39.8 43.1
Finland 1975-2004 8.9 15.2 45.5 44.2 -5.4 -3.8  1.8 -3.5 -6.1 -5.3 -1.5 -5.6 39.9 43.7 54.3 47.8 46.0 49.0 55.9 53.4
Denmark 1971-2004 14.7 65.0 68.3 44.8 -2.0  2.1 0.9 -2.2 -3.6 -5.2 -5.1 -4.9 43.6 49.4 52.6 51.8 47.2 54.6 57.6 56.7
Sweden 1970-2004 28.0 53.9 64.9 51.8 -2.5  1.6 3.1 -1.5 -4.6 -4.6 -2.5 -4.1 46.8 54.4 58.6 54.7 51.1 59.0 61.2 58.8
United Kingdom 1970-2004 64.5 49.8 44.9 40.7 2.5 2.3 3.7 1.4 -1.6  2.3 3.7 1.4 40.6 40.9 39.9 39.9 42.2 43.3 39.5 40.8
Euro-area countries (2) 31.6 56.2 75.1 69.0 1.4 5.6 4.2 1.3 -0.5  0.3 -1.9  -2.2  39.7 43.3 44.0 43.5 40.1 43.0 46.0 45.7
EU  countries  (2) 32.5 56.2 71.7 64.0 0.9 4.8 3.9 0.9 -1.2 -0.3 -1.8 -2.3 40.8 44.4 45.4 44.6 41.9 45.0 47.4 47.1
(1) Positive values indicate deficits; negative values indicate supluses. - (2) Unweighted average.
Revenue Primary expenditure Debt Overall balance (1) Primary balance (1)
 





Table 1b - Descriptive Statistics: primary expenditure composition
(percentage on primary expenditure; average values over the indicated period)
1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000
1979 1989 1999 2004 1979 1989 1999 2004 1979 1989 1999 2004
Belgium 1970-2004 32.6 36.7 38.0 35.8 26.0 26.0 26.9 26.8 41.4 37.3 35.1 37.4
Germany 1970-2004 36.1 37.0 39.1 43.2 23.9 21.8 19.6 17.6 40.0 41.2 41.3 39.1
Greece 1988-2004 39.1 39.5 42.1 31.1 29.7 28.0 29.8 30.8 29.9
Spain 1970-2004 34.4 36.9 36.3 32.6 31.3 27.8 28.5 27.6 34.3 35.3 35.2 39.8
France 1979-2004 34.1 34.9 36.0 35.8 28.7 27.4 26.6 26.8 37.0 37.7 37.4 37.4
Ireland 1985-2004 34.0 32.2 27.3 26.5 28.3 26.1 39.5 39.4 46.6
Italy 1980-2004 35.4 39.0 40.0 28.4 27.4 25.4 36.3 33.6 34.6
Netherlands 1975-2004 34.0 36.3 34.1 26.6 29.9 24.7 23.1 23.5 36.0 39.0 42.8 49.8
Austria 1976-2004 33.7 35.3 36.8 39.3 23.9 24.0 23.6 20.4 42.5 40.7 39.6 40.3
Portugal 1977-2004 21.4 26.6 28.8 32.2 31.3 31.2 34.8 34.0 47.4 42.2 36.3 33.7
Finland 1975-2004 27.4 30.1 37.4 34.9 32.2 32.1 28.6 28.5 40.3 37.8 33.9 36.6
Denmark 1971-2004 29.0 33.5 36.4 34.0 37.0 36.7 33.4 33.9 33.9 29.8 30.2 32.1
Sweden 1970-2004 30.1 33.5 34.5 32.4 35.4 34.1 29.6 29.6 34.6 32.4 36.0 38.0
United Kingdom 1970-2004 24.7 32.9 36.4 33.7 30.6 30.7 27.5 26.1 44.7 36.4 36.1 40.2
Euro-area countries (1) 31.7 34.8 36.1 35.4 28.4 27.4 27.0 25.9 39.9 37.9 36.9 38.7
EU countries (1) 30.7 34.4 36.0 35.0 30.0 28.8 27.7 26.7 39.3 36.8 36.3 38.3
(1) Unweighted average.
Transfers in cash Wages Other Primary Expenditure  22
Table 2 - Fiscal Reaction Functions for the Overall Balance (1)
A - 4 with ten-
years dummy 
variables
B - 4 with ten-
years dummy 
variables
C - 4  D - 4 
E - 4 with 
dummy92 all 
variables
F - 4 with 
dummy92 
constant and debt
G - 4 with 
dummy92 constant 
and debt
H - BF (2004) 
(2)
Fixed effect Arellano bond Fixed effect Arellano bond Fixed effect Fixed effect Arellano bond Arellano bond
a Constant 1.597 *** -0.158 *** 1.623 *** 0.005 1.113 *** 1.077 *** -0.006  0.026
(0.318) (0.027) (0.305) (0.017) (0.318) (0.311) (0.021) (0.016)
a1 Dummy for 1992 1.900 *** 1.757 *** 1.889 ***
(0.477) (0.457) (0.639)
b Lagged Dependent Variable 0.822 *** 0.810 *** 0.820 *** 0.825 *** 0.725 *** 0.744 *** 0.746 *** 0.841 ***
(0.033) (0.028) (0.029) (0.033) (0.045) (0.032) (0.036) (0.028)
b1 Lagged Dependent Variable after 1992 0.018
(0.054)
c Lagged  Debt -0.032 *** -0.027 *** -0.024 *** -0.029 *** -0.005  -0.006  -0.009  -0.013 **
(0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (-0.006)
c1 Lagged Debt after 1992 -0.037 *** -0.034 *** -0.034 *** -0.029 ***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006)
d Positive  Output  Gap -0.034 -0.131  * -0.033 -0.040  -0.064  -0.081 -0.085  -0.129 
(0.097) (0.071) (0.094) (0.088) (0.108) (0.095) (0.091) (0.791)
d1 Positive Output Gap after 1992 -0.195 
(0.210)
e Negative  Output  Gap -0.458 *** -0.391 *** -0.458 *** -0.457 *** -0.439 *** -0.522 *** -0.511 *** -0.416 ***
(0.099) (0.082) (0.099) (0.086) (0.130) (0.099) (0.076) (0.081)
e1 Negative Output Gap after 1992 -0.143 
(0.181)
f1 Dummy 1980-89 0.426 1.690 ***
(0.285) (0.320)
f2 Dummy 1990-99 0.735 ** 3.463 ***
(0.353) (0.459)
f3 Dummy 2000-04 0.653 * 4.520 ***
(0.355) (0.492)
g asymmetry index φ=d-e 0.424 ** 0.260 *** 0.425 ** 0.417 *** 0.375 * 0.440 *** 0.426 *** 0.287 ***
(0.168) (0.086) (0.165) (0.095) (0.207) (0.165) (0.088) (0.032)
test joint significance of dummy variables
1.560 94.640 ***
(0.199) (0.000)
test dummy 1990-99=dummy 2000-04 0.082
(0,262)
Sargan test 426.83 (0.971) 462.03 (0.757) 463.71 (0.739) 445.52 (0.653)
2nd order autocorrelation -0.26 (0.795) -0.23 (0.819) -0.31 (0.757) -1.11 (0.269)
nr. of observations 400 386 400 386 400 400 386 391
test if cyclical asymmetry is different before and 
after 1992 0.322
(0.270)
(1) *,**, ***=signficance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets. Sample countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
(2) Sample countries: same as in footnote (1). Period: 1970-2000.
Spain, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden. Period: 1970-2004.  23
 
Table 3 - Fiscal Reaction Functions for the Primary Balance (1)
A - 9 with  
dummy92 all 
variables








Fixed effect Fixed effect Arellano bond
a Constant 0.688 ** 0.722 ** -0.001 
(0.289) (0.283) (0.020)
a1 Dummy for 1992 1.939 *** 1.696 *** 1.718 ***
(0.453) (0.428) (0.439)
b Lagged Dependent Variable 0.622 *** 0.632 *** 0.636 ***
(0.445) (0.036) (0.021)
b1 Lagged Dependent Variable after 1992 -0.043 
(0.059)
c Lagged Debt 0.004 -0.008  -0.011 
(0.012) (0.008) (0.012)
c1 Lagged Debt after 1992 -0.045  *** -0.027  *** -0.027  ***
(0.013) (0.006) (0.007)
d Change in Interest Exp. 0.295 0.243 0.229
(0.261) (0.196) (0.218)
d1 Change in Interest Exp. after 1992 -0.131 
(0.395)
e Lagged Interest Exp. -0.334  *** -0.216  *** -0.203  **
(0.114) (0.074) (0.092)
e1 Lagged Interest Exp. after 1992 0.152
(0.130)
f Positive Output Gap -0.115  -0.158  * -0.168  **
(0.095) (0.089) (0.070)
f1 Positive Output Gap after 1992 -0.347  *
(0.197)
g Negative  Output  Gap -0.298 ** -0.416 *** -0.406 ***
(0.143) (0.103) (0.075)
g1 Negative Output Gap after 1992 -0.203 
(0.189)
h asymmetry index φ=f-g 0.183 0.258 0.238 ***
(0.212) (0.167) (0.088)
Sargan test 460.13 (0.776)
2nd order autocorrelation 0.22 (0.825)
nr. of observations 400 400 386
test if cyclical asymmetry is different before and after 1992 0.040
(0.269)
(1) *,**, ***=signficance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets. Sample countries:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, the




Table 4 - Deficit and Debt long-run levels (1)










Belgium 5.9 3.7 -2.2 117.2 73.6 -43.6 
Germany 1.5 2.1 0.7 29.1 42.6 13.5
Greece 8.5 4.6 -3.9 169.4 92.0 -77.4 
Spain 1.8 2.3 0.4 36.7 45.3 8.6
France 1.9 2.3 0.4 38.5 45.9 7.4
Ireland 0.5 1.8 1.3 10.3 35.9 25.7
Italy 7.7 4.3 -3.4 154.7 86.8 -67.9 
Netherlands 2.1 2.3 0.3 41.1 46.8 5.7
Austria 1.8 2.2 0.5 35.9 45.0 9.1
Portugal 3.5 2.8 -0.6 69.1 56.7 -12.4 
Finland -3.8 0.3 4.1 -76.5 5.4 81.9
Denmark -1.2 1.2 2.4 -23.2  24.2 47.4
Sweden -0.6 1.4 2.0 -11.5  28.3 39.8
United Kingdom 1.7 2.2 0.5 33.3 44.0 10.8
Euro-area countries (2) 2.8 2.6 -0.2  56.8 52.3 -4.5 
EU countries (2) 2.2 2.4 0.2 44.6 48.0 3.5
(2) Unweighted average.
Overall balance Debt
(1) Computed using the estimated coefficients in Table 3 (Column B) and setting the





Table 5 - Fiscal Reaction Functions for Primary Expenditure, Revenue and the Primary Balance (1)
Fixed effect Fixed effect
a Constant 38.487 *** 37.801 *** 0.685
(0.699) (0.621)
a1 Dummy for 1992 4.459 *** 2.706 *** 1.753
(0.828) (0.776)
b Lagged Primary Balance 0.542 *** -0.087  0.629
(0.076) (0.067)
c Lagged Debt 0.115 0.123 *** -0.008 
(0.017) (0.016)
c1 Lagged Debt after 1992 -0.054  *** -0.027  ** -0.028 
(0.013) (0.013)
d Change in Interest Exp. 0.210 -0.103  0.314
(0.363) (0.283)
e Lagged Interest Exp. -0.089  0.124 -0.213 
(0.142) (0.132)
f Positive Output Gap -0.162  -0.013  -0.149 
(0.196) (0.174)
g Negative Output Gap -0.589  *** -0.183  -0.406 
(0.222) (0.185)
h asymmetry index φ=f-g 0.427 0.170 0.257
(0.355) (0.299)
nr. of observations 400 400
(1) *,**, ***=signficance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets.
Sample countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden. Period: 1970-2004.
A - 12, Primary 
expenditure
B - 12, Revenue
C - Implied Primary 
balance fiscal 
reaction from (A) 
and (B)




Table 6 - Fiscal Reaction Functions for the Primary Expenditure Components, Revenue and the Primary Balance (1)
A - 12, 
Transfers in 
cash
B - 12, Wages
C - 12, Other 
primary 
expenditure
D - 12, 
Revenue




(A), (B), (C) 
and (D)
Fixed effect Fixed effect Fixed effect Fixed effect
a Constant 11.540 11.780 *** 15.166 *** 37.801 *** 0.685
(0.355) (0.235) (0.326) (0.621)
a1 Dummy for 1992 2.337 *** -0.170 2.293 *** 2.706 *** 1.753
(0.446) (0.314) (0.393) (0.776)
b Lagged Primary Balance 0.257 *** 0.093 *** 0.193 *** -0.087 0.629
(0.043) (0.029) (0.041) (0.067)
c Lagged Debt 0.056 *** 0.011 * 0.048 *** 0.123 *** -0.008 
(0.011) (0.006) (0.009) (0.016)
c1 Lagged Debt after 1992 -0.022 *** -0.002  -0.030 *** -0.027 ** -0.028 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.013)
d Change in Interest Exp. -0.074 0.141 0.144 -0.103 0.314
(0.171) (0.127) (0.166) (0.283)
e Lagged Interest Exp. 0.106 0.077 -0.272 *** 0.124 -0.213 
(0.089) (0.057) (0.065) (0.132)
f Positive Output Gap -0.058 -0.036 -0.068 -0.013 -0.149 
(0.102) (0.063) (0.088) (0.174)
g Negative Output Gap -0.284 ** -0.146  -0.158 * -0.183  -0.406 
(0.115) (0.090) (0.095) (0.185)
h asymmetry index φ=f-g 0.227 0.110 0.090 0.170 0.257
(0.188) (0.126) (0.161) (0.299)
nr. of observations 400 400 400 400
(1) *,**, ***=signficance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets. Sample countries:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, Sweden. Period: 1970-2004.  




Table 7 - Fiscal Reaction Functions for Primary Expenditure, Revenue (SUR estimation) and the Primary Balance (1)
a Constant 35.522 *** 33.577 *** 1.945
(1.119) (1.000)
a1 Dummy for 1992 2.352 *** 0.875 1.477
(0.903) (0.807)
b Lagged Primary Balance 0.639 *** -0.028  0.667
(0.072) (0.064)
c Lagged Debt 0.122 *** 0.124 *** -0.002 
(0.019) (0.017)
c1 Lagged Debt after 1992 0.001 0.008 -0.007 
(0.007) (0.006)
d Change in Interest Exp. 0.077 -0.145  0.223
(0.354) (0.317)
e Lagged Interest Exp. -0.220  0.073 -0.293 
(0.156) (0.140)
f Positive Output Gap -0.212  -0.035  -0.178 
(0.170) (0.152)
g Negative Output Gap -0.503  *** -0.125  -0.379 
(0.187) (0.167)
h asymmetry index φ=f-g 0.291 0.090 0.201
(0.302) (0.270)
nr. of observations 400 400
(1) *,**, ***=signficance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. Standard errors in brackets. Sample
countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
Spain, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden.
A - 12, Primary 
expenditure
B - 12, Revenue
C - Implied Primary 
balance fiscal 
reaction from (A) 
and (B)




Table 8 - Fiscal Reaction Functions for the Primary Expenditure Components, Revenue (SUR estimation) and the Primary Balance (1)
A - 12, 
Transfers in 
cash
B - 12, Wages
C - 12, Other 
primary 
expenditure
D - 12, 
Revenue




(A), (B), (C) 
and (D)
a Constant 10.045 *** 10.463 *** 15.015 *** 33.577 *** 1.945
(0.603) (0.403) (0.526) (1.000)
a1 Dummy for 1992 1.078 ** 0.756 ** 0.518 0.875 1.477
(0.487) (0.325) (0.424) (0.807)
b Lagged Primary Balance 0.308 *** 0.088 *** 0.244 *** -0.028 0.667
(0.039) (0.026) (0.034) (0.064)
c Lagged Debt 0.059 *** 0.016 ** 0.047 *** 0.124 *** -0.002 
(0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.017)
c1 Lagged Debt after 1992 0.008 ** -0.007 *** -0.000  0.008 -0.007 
(0.004) (0.0002) (0.003) (0.006)
d Change in Interest Exp. -0.133 0.087 0.124 -0.145 0.223
(0.191) (0.128) (0.166) (0.317)
e Lagged Interest Exp. 0.046 0.038 -0.303 *** 0.073 -0.293 
(0.084) (0.056) (0.074) (0.140)
f Positive Output Gap -0.082 -0.048 -0.083 -0.035 -0.178 
(0.091) (0.061) (0.080) (0.152)
g Negative Output Gap -0.238 ** -0.159 ** -0.107  -0.125  -0.379 
(0.101) (0.067) (0.088) (0.167)
h asymmetry index φ=f-g 0.156 0.111 0.024 0.090 0.201
(0.163) (0.109) (0.142) (0.270)
nr. of observations 400 400 400
(1) *,**, ***=signficance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. Standard errors in brackets. Sample countries: Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, the United




Table 9 - Asymmetry impact on debt accumulation and overall deficit













Belgium 1970-2004 31.8 5.8 0.16
Germany 1970-2004 47.8 6.0 0.17
Greece 1988-2004 42.1 3.9 0.23
Spain 1970-2004 33.9 8.5 0.24
France 1979-2004 44.4 6.0 0.23
Ireland 1985-2004 -71.8 9.9 0.49
Italy 1980-2004 47.6 5.1 0.20
Netherlands 1975-2004 14.9 6.0 0.20
Austria 1976-2004 37.5 4.7 0.16
Portugal 1977-2004 33.1 11.0 0.39
Finland 1975-2004 38.5 15.8 0.53
Denmark 1971-2004 29.5 7.1 0.21
Sweden 1970-2004 23.9 9.2 0.26
United Kingdom 1970-2004 -37.1  8.4 0.24
Euro-area countries (2) 27.3 7.5 0.27
EU countries (2) 22.6 7.7 0.27
(1) Computed using the estimated coefficients in Table 3 (Column B).
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